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Abstract
We use a long panel data set for four cohorts of male blue-collar workers en-
tering into an internal labor market to analyze the effect of age on the proba-
bility of participating in different employer-financed training measures. We 
find that training participation probabilities are inverted u-shaped with age 
and that longer training measures are undertaken earlier in life and working 
career. These findings are consistent with predictions from a human capital 
model that incorporates amortization period and screening effects.
JEL Codes: J14, J24, M53
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1.  Introduction
Older workers have on average higher employment stability than younger workers 
but lower reemployment probabilities and often longer unemployment durations in 
most countries (e.g. Hutchens, 1988; Chan & Stevens, 2001; OECD, 2005; OECD, 
2008; EU, 2009). This leads to hardships for unemployed older workers (e.g. loss in 
consumption standards, psychological burden due to loss of main activity and social 
networks) and to society, because tax payers have to finance unemployment benefits 
or early retirement schemes. Therefore, identifying the factors that might lead to 
employment barriers for older workers is of central importance in times of demo-
graphic change. One major economic explanation for employment barriers is that 
older workers might have a productivity that is lower than their wages. As productiv-
ity is largely determined by human capital investments, the relationship between 
train ing and aging can help us to understand disadvantages of older workers in the 
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labor market. If firms and workers invest less in human capital at later stages of 
workers’ careers, and if firms cannot adjust individual wages (e.g. due to collective 
contracts or minimum wage legislations), it would be less profitable for firms to 
employ older workers. Productivity enhancing training might alter the incentives to 
expand employment contracts in current firms and to integrate older unemployed 
workers in new firms (Gruber & Wise, 1998). In times of rapid technological change, 
training becomes increasingly important because computer-based technologies de-
mand a new range of abilities, which older workers need to acquire in order to avoid 
the depreciation of skills and competencies (Friedberg, 2003). 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of aging on the participation probability in 
employer-financed training in an internal labor market to shed some light into the 
black box of training decisions in firms. For this purpose, we develop a simple mod-
el for the timing decision when to train a worker, which accounts for screening and 
amortization period effects and from which our econometric framework is generat-
ed. We further use a personnel data set that contains information on more than 10,000 
yearly observations for 400 male blue-collar workers of a German company for four 
entry cohorts. The length of the panel is longer than 24 years. The data contain 
unique information about four different training measures: short training course, 
longer training course, longer vocational re-training, and academy of vocational 
training. Although results from personnel data are not necessarily representative, 
they have the advantage of overcoming unobserved firm and training course hetero-
geneity, which might bias results from survey data. To analyze the effect of age on 
training participation, we apply random effects Logit and multinomial Logit regres-
sions. The main results of our econometric case study are that training participation 
is inverted u-shaped with age and that longer training is performed earlier in life. 
These findings are in line with predictions from our theoretical model.
The subsequent paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes pre-
vious findings on age and training participation. In Section 3, we present a model for 
timing of training participation, from which we generate our main research hypoth-
eses and estimation framework. Section 4 informs about the personnel data set and 
provides descriptive statistics. The regression analyses are presented in Section 5. 
The paper concludes with a short summary and a discussion of the results.
2.  Previous research
Several empirical studies analyze worker characteristics to explain individual varia-
tion in training participation and find that education and age are the most important 
factors. Frazis et al. (2000) draw from a rich database of employer and employee 
surveys to analyze the educational effect on training participation in the U.S. They 
find significant positive effects of educational attainment on the incidence and inten-
sity of formal training. Similar results are found in panel data of young U.S. workers 
(Veum, 1997) and in European data (Oosterbeek, 1998; Arulampalam et al., 2004; 
Arulampalam & Booth, 1997).
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Theoretical models with respect to age and training emphasize two main arguments: 
the amortization (payback) period of training investments and the signaling function 
of training. The former explanation states that older workers are less likely to receive 
training due to lower total net returns associated with shorter time horizons until re-
tirement (Becker, 1962; Becker, 1993). Therefore, the investments into older work-
ers have to yield significantly larger gains to make their training profitable, espe-
cially when facing deferred payment schemes (Lazear, 1979). The signaling function 
of training refers to information asymmetries. After incurring hiring costs, firms still 
know little about the potential ability and productivity of the new employees. Train-
ing might reduce information asymmetries and is most effective early in workers' 
careers (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998). Overall, both arguments (amortization period 
and signaling) predict a negative correlation between training and age.
Oosterbeek (1998) uses Dutch household panel data to estimate univariate and bi-
variate Probit models with linear age as explanatory variable. He finds small but sig-
nificant negative age effects on training. Maximiano and Oosterbeek (2007) evaluate 
the impact of age on workers’ willingness to receive training and employers’ willing-
ness to provide training. They also report a small but significant negative linear age 
effect. Studies with non-linear age specifications provide a more detailed view of the 
correlation between age and training incidence. Leuven and Oosterbeek (1999) in-
clude binary age categories as independent variables in Probit and linear probability 
models of training. The results are heterogeneous with respect to size, direction, and 
significance across different countries. Whereas Canada and the Netherlands suggest 
an inverted u-shaped relation between age and training probability, Switzerland and 
the U.S. reveal no significant association. O’Connell and Byrne (2009) extend the 
empirical investigations by controlling for binary age categories within a multinomial 
Probit regression. Training classification distinguishes between no training, general 
training, and specific training. The empirical results suggest an inverted u-shaped rela-
tionship between age and training, which exhibits weak robustness when including 
further control variables. An inverted u-shaped age curve for participation in training 
is also found by Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2003), who use age, squared and cubed 
age as explanatory variables for training probability. The results provide small but ro-
bust age effects. Riphahn and Trübswetter (2006) also find an inverted u-shaped as-
sociation between age and training in German microcensus data. 
Whereas the downward-sloping part of the inverted u-shaped relationship, which 
has been found in several studies, can be explained by amortization period and sign-
aling effects, the upward-sloping part cannot. We therefore develop a new simple 
model for the timing decision of training participation in the next section, from 
which we derive our econometric framework and research hypotheses.
3. A model for timing of training participation
The focus of our subsequent model about age and training participation is not on the 
question of whether a firm and a worker invest in human capital, which is the core of 
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most models, but on the question of when the investment is undertaken. For simplic-
ity, we do not distinguish between firm and worker decisions; instead we treat train-
ing as a joint decision.1 As we discuss the effects on total rents, the rent-sharing as-
pect of human capital investments can be neglected and, hence, wages do not need 
to be incorporated into our model. Moreover, human capital investment is a binary 
choice variable, because our paper is about participation in training courses.
The basic mechanisms in our model are a «screening/learning effect» and an 
«amortization period effect» which have different directions. Younger workers are 
more engaged in job shopping and firms have to undertake more screening of young-
er workers, because uncertainty of their quality and willingness to stay in a specific 
job and firm is higher (e.g. Jovanovic, 1979; Topel & Ward, 1992; Farber & Gibbons, 
1996; Lange, 2007). Consequently, firms and workers have less incentives to invest 
in (firm-specific) human capital at the start of an employment relationship when a 
worker is young. If the match between worker and firm proves to be of good quality, 
both parties have incentives to undertake human capital investments. The worker 
benefits from higher future wages due to higher future productivity and from signal-
ing to the firm higher productivity and work attachment, which increases his promo-
tion probability and long-term income prospects. The firm benefits from higher future 
productivity of workers. The firm furthermore might need some time to learn about 
workers' skills to determine training contents and to select participants. We therefore 
expect that the training participation probability is positively correlated with age for 
younger workers («screening/learning effect»). Investment incentives, however, de-
cline with age because the amortization period decreases as a worker gets older and 
approaches retirement («amortization period effect»). While the total effect of age on 
training should be dominated by the «screening/learning effect» in the first years of 
workers' careers, the «amortization period effect» should dominate thereafter.
Let us now turn to the simple model. The decision to train a worker depends on 
total net rents of training R in equation (1).2 The net rents are the total increase in the 
value of productivity due to training ΔP (compared to the situation in which a work-
er receives no training) over all years t until retirement is reached minus the total 
fixed costs C of the training course. The age at which training takes place is denoted 
by a and retirement age by r. The length of the amortization period in years is there-
fore r–a. In the subsequent discussion, we consider two cases. The first case assumes 
no depreciation of human capital acquired in the training course, which leads to a 
constant productivity increase over time (ΔPt = ΔP0), while the second case ac-
knowledges human capital depreciation.
R[a] = ΔP – C =  ∑ 
t=1
 
r–a
ΔPt – C     (1)
1 In principal, workers and firms face the same effects. Thus, we would obtain the same insights if the 
investment decisions were analyzed separately. An advantage of analyzing the joint decision is that we 
can neglect the rent-sharing aspect of human capital investments.
2 Table A.1 in the Appendix contains a list of the model's variables.
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We begin by illustrating the «amortization period effect» for the first case. The total 
net rent is depicted in equation (2) and its first derivate with respect to age in equa-
tion (3). We see that one more year of age at training, which implies a reduction of 
the amortization period by one year, decreases the total net rent linear by the fore-
gone higher value of productivity in that additional year.
R = ΔP – C =  ∑ 
t=1
 
r–a
ΔP0 – C = (r – a)ΔP0 – C   (2)
 ∂R ___∂a = –ΔP0       (3)
In the next step, we introduce the «screening/learning effect». The «screening/learn-
ing effect» implies that the productivity increase is to some extent uncertain, which 
is represented through the expected total productivity increase as presented in equa-
tion (4). Firms and workers need to learn about the match quality and the willingness 
to engage in a long-term contract to benefit from returns of human capital invest-
ments. The firm further needs to learn about a worker’s human capital stock to deter-
mine course contents. Both learning necessities can be introduced through a learning 
parameter γ, which is a non-linear function of worker’s age at training. If training 
takes place later in life, the more has been learned about a worker, but with decreas-
ing marginal returns to learning.3 Because the learning parameter γ is restricted to 
values between zero and one, γ can be interpreted as the probability that a worker 
has the increased productivity after training and (1– γ) as the probability that train-
ing does not increase productivity (ΔP = 0). 
E [ΔP] = γ[a]((r – a) ΔP0)  with   
∂γ
 ___∂a > 0,  
∂2γ ___∂a2 < 0  (4)
Equation (5) presents the expected total net rent combining the «amortization period 
effect» and the «screening/learning effect». The first derivate in equation (6) shows 
that the expected total net rent increases with age as long as   ∂γ __∂a (r – a) ΔP0 > γ[a] ΔP0 
and decreases with age if  ∂γ __∂a (r – a) ΔP0 < γ[a] ΔP0 . It can be seen that the left hand 
side of the first order condition for the maximum expected total net rent in equation 
(7) decreases with age and that the right hand side increases with age. This is also 
reflected in the second derivate in equation (8). Overall, the age effect is non-linear 
with an inverted u-shaped relationship between the expected total net rent of training 
and the age at which training takes place.
E[R] = E[ΔP] – C = γ[a]((r – a) ΔP0) – C   (5)
3 Note that learning in our model depends only on age. This can be reasoned by the fact that workers in 
our model are homogeneous with respect to entry age and tenure is age minus entry age. A rationale 
in a model with heterogeneous entry age would be that learning can also take place through previous 
work careers in other firms (e.g. experience, signals).
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We now consider the second case with human capital depreciation, which leads quali-
tatively to same results as the first case. Human capital depreciation is introduced 
through the depreciation factor (1 + β)t > 1, i.e. the productivity increase due to train-
ing is lower in later periods than in earlier periods after training participation (ΔPt = 
ΔP0(1 + β)-t). The new expected total net rents from training are presented in equa-
tion (9). From the first derivate in equation (10) and the second derivate in equation 
(11), we can again see that the relationship between expected total net rents and age at 
training is also inverted u-shaped if we account for human capital depreciation.
E[R]  = γ[a] ∑ 
t = 1
r – a ΔP0 _______ (1 + β)t – C               (9)
     =
  
 ∂γ __∂a  ∑ t = 1 
r – a ΔP0 _______ (1 + β)t
  ⏟
>0
 
–
  
γ[a] 
ΔP0ln(1 + β)  ___________(1 + β)(r – a)β  
  ⏟
>0
 
= 0           (10)
         
=
  
 ∂
2γ ___
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  ⏟
<0
 
–
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–
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ΔP0 ln(1 + β)2  ____________(1 + β)(r – a)β  
  ⏟
>0
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The probability of participating in training at a given age (Ta=1) is depicted in equa-
tion (12) and depends on expected total net rents at that age. To be more precise, 
training takes place (Ta=1) if the expected total net rents plus an idiosyncratic nor-
mally distributed error term ε with zero mean are larger than some threshold value z. 
Because we have shown that expected total net rents are inverted u-shaped with age, 
the training probability should also be inverted u-shaped with age.
Pr [ Ta = 1| E [ R [ a ]]] = Pr [ E [ R [ a ]] + ε > z]         (12)
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From equation (12), we can derive our econometric model applying a second order 
Taylor approximation to the expected total net rents (E [ R ]). Equation (13) states the 
basic Logit model we have to estimate, in which ρ1 and ρ2 denote the coefficients for 
age and squared age, λ are the coefficients for a vector of control variables X, and Λ 
is the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution.
Pr [Ta = 1|a,X] = Pr [ρ1a + ρ2a2 + λX + ε > z] = Λ[ρ1a + ρ2a2 + λX]      (13)
To summarize, we can formulate our main research hypothesis on the timing of 
train ing, which is then tested using longitudinal personnel data and Logit models in 
the next sections. 
Hypothesis 1: The training participation probability is inverted u-shaped with 
age (ρ1 > 0 and ρ2 < 0).
Our model also allows us to generate an additional hypothesis. Longer and, conse-
quently more expensive, training courses are likely to increase productivity (ΔP) by 
more than shorter training courses. Therefore, the «amortization period effect» (–ΔPt) 
is larger for longer training courses so that expected net rents are, ceteris paribus, 
maximized at earlier training age.
Hypothesis 2: The training participation probability peaks at earlier age for 
longer training courses.
4. Data set and descriptive statistics
We use personnel data of a large German company from the energy sector located in 
West Germany. The company is subject to a collective contract and has a works 
council. Due to data protection reasons, we are neither allowed to name the company 
nor to provide any further information. The data contain a subsample of 438 blue-
collar workers in the company’s mining business. All of these workers entered the 
firm in four subsequent cohorts, from 1976 until 1979, and stayed in the company 
over the entire observation period up to the year 2002. The sample represents a share 
of about 25 percent of all employees in the company's operation unit and 3.5 percent 
of the company's entire workforce.
A disadvantage of our quasi-balanced panel design is that we have no information 
about workers who left the firm so that we cannot control for a potential selection 
bias. The data set is nevertheless adequate to study the long-term issues of an aging 
workforce and of career aspects in the context of human capital investments due to 
its large panel length. We include only German male blue-collar workers without 
missing values in the variables we use. This restriction reduces our sample by only 
5 percent. The final sample contains 10,544 yearly observations of 415 different 
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workers (1976: number of workers n = 105, panel length in years T = 27; 1977: n = 96, 
T = 26; 1978: n = 77, T = 25; 1979: n = 137, T = 24).
The data set allows us to use two kinds of training variables. The first variable is 
binary and takes the value one if a worker participated in training in a given year. 
Thus, we can apply a random effects Logit model. The second variable indicates 
what kind of training a worker received so that multinomial Logit models are ap-
propriate. If a worker did not participate in training in a given year the value is zero. 
For training participation, we have information about four different training meas-
ures: (1) short training course («kurze Schulung») (one or two days), (2) longer 
training course («längere Schulung») (up to several weeks), (3) longer vocational 
re-training («längere Umschulung») (up to several weeks), and (4) longer academy 
of vocational training («Berufsakademie») (up to several weeks). Unfortunately, we 
do not have information about earnings of workers. We know however that workers 
are paid during the training measures and do not have to cover any direct costs. Table 
1 presents summary statistics of the training measures. On average 6.3 percent of the 
workers in our sample participated in some kind of training in an average year, 
which results in 664 training cases in our observation period. About two thirds of all 
cases are short training courses, whereas the other training measures are nearly 
equally distributed.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of training variables
Mean Standard deviation
Training cases 
(total number)
Training (all) (dummy) 0.0630 0.2429 664
Training measures 
(reference (0) no training):
(1) Short training 0.0405 0.1971 427
(2) Longer training 0.0073 0.0851 77
(3) Longer re-training 0.0068 0.0824 72
(4) Longer academy 0.0083 0.0910 88
Notes: Number of observations is 10,544 from 415 workers in a balanced panel design.
Our main interest lies in the impact of age on training participation. We specify age 
in two non-linear ways in the subsequent regression analyses. First, we use dummy 
variables for the age category. Second, we use age in years and its higher terms. 
Though most age variance stems from within as we observe workers for at least 24 
years, between-age variance also exists as the workers were born between 1952 and 
1963. We further consider dummy variables for schooling and apprenticeship de-
grees to account for skill differences of workers at the time they enter the firm. More 
information about the explanatory variables is given in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
First descriptive evidence for the impact of age on the overall training participa-
tion probability is depicted in Figure 1. The results are based on estimations using 
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robust locally weighted regressions. This is a non parametric approach to smooth 
scatter plots based on multiple weighted linear regressions for every observation 
point (Cleveland, 1979). It can be seen that our expected inverted u-shape relation-
ship is indeed confirmed by the data, which stresses the importance of non-linear 
specification of age when estimating the determinants of training participation.
 
Figure 1: Age and participation probability in training from locally weighted regressions
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5. Regression analyses
At first, we estimate a random effects Logit model for the general participation prob-
ability in training. The likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the vari-
ance of the random effects is zero. As our dependent variable is binary and has a 
rather low expected probability, linear regressions would yield a high share of out-
side predictions. We estimate two specifications, which reveal in principal the same 
results. The first specification includes dummy variables for age categories and the 
second specification includes polynomials of age in years (until the quartic term). 
The results of the binary random effects Logit regressions are presented in Table 2. 
Though we also present the coefficients, our main interest is on marginal effects at 
the means of all covariates as well as on predicted probabilities.
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Table 2: Determinants of training participation
(1- 
Coeff.)
(2- 
Coeff.) (1-Mfx) (2-Mfx)
Age categories (reference:15–19)      
Age category 20–24 (dummy) 0.974(0.343) **
0.061
(0.028) **
Age category 25–29 (dummy) 1.149(0.338) ***
0.073
(0.029) ***
Age category 30–34 (dummy) 0.854(0.342) **
0.050
(0.025) **
Age category 35–39 (dummy) 1.699(0.333) ***
0.129
(0.038) ***
Age category 40–44 (dummy) 1.643(0.337) ***
0.129
(0.041) ***
Age category 45–54 (dummy) 0.759(0.408) *
0.047
(0.033) *
Age polynomials
Age in years 9.153(1.735) ***
Age squared / 100 –44.873(8.33) ***
Age cubed / 1000 9.563(1.737) ***
Age quartic / 10000 –0.746(0.133) ***
Mfx: Age polynomials 0.001(0.0005) **
Schooling 
(reference: no school degree)
Low school degree 
(«Hauptschule») (dummy)
0.014
(0.153)
0.014
(0.152)
0.001
(0.007)
0.001
(0.007)
Higher school degree 
(at least «Realschule») (dummy)
0.488
(0.227) **
0.482
(0.226) **
0.027
(0.015) **
0.024
(0.011) **
Apprenticeship 
(reference: no apprenticeship)
Apprenticeship degree in firm 0.438(0.166) **
0.412
(0.165) **
0.022
(0.009) **
0.020
(0.008) **
Apprenticeship degree outside firm 0.105(0.144)
0.077
(0.144)
0.005
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
Observations 10544 10544   
Wald test 111.83 *** 99.2 ***
LR test of rho=0 65.82 *** 65.67 ***   
Note: Random effects Logit (coefficients and marginal effects). Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for mar-
ginal effects are calculated by using the delta method.*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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The first specification in Table 2 indicates that training participation is inverted u-
shaped with age and peaks during the middle-age years, between 35 to 45, which is 
in line with our first hypothesis. We further use the results of our second specification 
to plot predicted probabilities in Figure 2. The participation probability is to some 
degree inverted u-shaped with age. As we have considered higher age polynomials, 
we do not smooth the age effect as we did in the robust locally weighted regressions 
in Figure 1 in the previous section. That we do not find a smoother u-shaped pattern 
is also reasoned by training course heterogeneity in the binary pooled training meas-
ure we employ. Therefore, a multinomial Logit model for different training measures 
is likely to identify age effects more accurately.
 
Figure 2: Age and predicted participation probability in training from random effects Logit
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Our Logit estimates in Table 2 further show that workers with higher schooling (at 
least «Realschule») and workers with an apprenticeship degree earned in the firm 
have significantly higher training participation probabilities. Differences between 
low schooling and no school degree as well as between an outside apprenticeship 
and no apprenticeship degree are not significant. Higher schooling is likely to be as-
sociated with higher levels of general human capital, whereas an internal apprentice-
ship is associated with job specific human capital. Both kinds of human capital might 
have a self-productivity effect on further skill acquisition, which increases incen-
tives to invest in training for the worker as well as the firm. The firm might also have 
better knowledge of qualifications and skills of their own former apprentices and can 
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therefore determine training contents and predict outcomes (e.g. training success, 
productivity effects, willingness to stay in firm) more precisely. 
In the next step, we use a multinomial Logit model to estimate participation prob-
abilities in different training measures [(0) no training, (1) short training course, (2) 
longer training course, (3) longer vocational re-training, (4) longer academy of voca-
tional training], which includes age polynomials and only dummies for higher school-
ing (at least «Realschule») and internal apprenticeship absolved within the firm. We 
leave out the other educational categories, because we would otherwise have the prob-
lem of perfect predictions in different outcome variables. As has been shown in the 
previous binary Logit estimates, the reduction of categories is reasonable because we 
have not found significant differences between workers without a school degree and 
workers with the lowest school degree («Hauptschule») and between workers without 
apprenticeship degrees and workers with apprenticeship degrees earned in other firms. 
The multinomial Logit model is often criticized because of its reliance on the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption and some authors argue for us-
ing the Probit rather than the Logit approach (e.g. Alvarez & Nagler, 1995). Recent 
studies show however that the multinomial Logit model performs better in practice, 
even under serious violations of the IIA (Dow & Endersby, 2004; Kropko, 2008). We 
decided to use the Logit approach and carried out a test in order to check whether the 
IIA is violated in our special case. In detail we carried out the test proposed by Haus-
man and McFadden (1984). The null hypothesis that the odds of our different out-
come categories are independent of other alternatives could not be rejected for any 
category. Table 3 informs about the multinomial Logit regression results. 
Table 3: Determinants of participation in different training measures
(1) 
Short 
training
(2) 
Longer 
training
(3) 
Longer 
re-training
(4) 
Longer 
academy
Age polynomials         
Age in years 5.414(1.951) ***
4.188
(6.479)
13.830
(6.901) **
30.392
(12.897) **
Age squared / 100 –29.896(9.427) ***
–17.029
(33.584)
–69.635
(35.672) *
–131.686
(60.284) **
Age cubed / 1000 7.077(1.972) ***
3.000
(7.590)
15.272
(8.037) *
24.961
(12.362) **
Age quartic / 10000 –0.600(0.151) ***
–0.206
(0.631)
–1.238
(0.666) *
–1.756
(0.938) *
Schooling 
(Reference: no/low degree)
Higher school degree (at least 
«Realschule») (dummy)
–0.005
(0.179)
0.662
(0.335) **
0.108
(0.469)
1.428
(0.239) ***
Apprenticeship 
(Reference: no/external degree)
Apprenticeship degree in firm 
(dummy)
0.227
(0.113) *
0.430
(0.243) *
–0.918
(0.360) **
1.644
(0.234) ***
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Constant –39.833(14.713) **
–41.354
(45.986)
–104.887
(49.088) **
–263.261
(102.144) ***
Observations 10544
LR Chi²(24) 517.200  ***
Pseudo R² 0.082
Note: Multinomial Logit (coefficients). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
To make interpretation of the results in the multinomial Logit model easier, we plot-
ted the predicted probabilities at different age levels for each training measure in 
Figure 3. Short training courses are the most frequently used measure, which peak in 
probability at age 42. Longer training and re-training courses have quite similar pro-
files with peaks between 23 and 25 years. Longer training in the academy is most 
likely to occur in the late 20s. For each training measure, we find an inverted u-shaped 
impact of age, which is more pronounced than in the previous binary Logit estimates 
for the pooled training probability. The results further indicate that longer and, hence, 
more costly training measures are more likely to be undertaken earlier in life, which 
supports our second hypothesis. Older workers seem to receive only short training to 
update their skills. Career enhancing training (academy) is mainly performed by middle-
aged workers and training to close a qualification gap (longer training and re-training) 
is primarily performed by young workers.
Figure 3: Age and participation probabilities of different training measures  
from multinomial Logit
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We can also see from the multinomial Logit results in Table 3 that workers with 
higher secondary schooling are more likely to receive longer training and to attend 
academy training. Workers with an internal apprenticeship are more likely to receive 
short and longer training as well as academy training but are less likely to get voca-
tional re-training. The latter result is quite plausible as outside workers might have 
the wrong qualifications for the job and need re-training. Job-specific and firm-spe-
cific skills acquired during an internal apprenticeship might have a self-productivity 
effect on acquiring further specific skills, which might explain the enormous advan-
tage of insiders in attending the academy for vocational training because in this 
training measure advanced skills are taught.
6. Conclusion
The main results of our econometric case study are that (1) training participation is 
inverted u-shaped with age, (2) longer training courses are mainly performed earlier 
in the career, and (3) old workers above the age of 50 years are unlikely to receive 
any training. Especially the low training probability of older workers, which is like-
ly to be caused by shorter amortization periods, might explain disadvantages of 
older workers in the labor market (e.g. low re-employment probability). A possible 
policy intervention are training subsidies targeted at older workers that could coun-
ter the effect of decreasing amortization periods and, consequently, should increase 
the training participation probability, which would hopefully enhance productivity 
and employability of older workers. Because the amortization period decreases with 
age, the training subsidies should also increase with age to be effective.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Variable list for theoretical model
Variable name Variable description
T Binary training participation
R Total net rents from training
ΔP Total increase in productivity due to training
ΔPt Increase in productivity due to training in period t after training
C Costs of training
a Age when training takes place
r Retirement age
t Period after training
γ Learning parameter
β Depreciation rate
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Age categories Mean
Age category 15–19 (dummy) 0.0513
Age category 20–24 (dummy) 0.1582
Age category 25–29 (dummy) 0.1946
Age category 30–34 (dummy) 0.1968
Age category 35–39 (dummy) 0.1968
Age category 40–44 (dummy) 0.1545
Age category 45–54 (dummy) 0.0478
Age polynomials
Age at end of year (years) [standard deviation: 7.85; min.: 15; max.: 54] 31.9303
Age squared / 100 10.8124
Age cubed / 1000 38.4732
Age quartic / 10000 142.5961
Schooling (reference: no degree)
Low school degree («Hauptschule») (dummy) 0.7209
Higher school degree (at least «Realschule») (dummy) 0.0799
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Apprenticeship (reference: no degree)
Apprenticeship degree outside firm (dummy) 0.4803
Apprenticeship degree in firm (dummy) 0.2514
Note: Number of observations is 10,544 from 415 workers in a balanced panel design.
Table A2 continued
